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Abstract – String of Pearl (SoP) is China’s strategy to expand its influence from China Mainland to the 
Middle East through strategic areas, like Malacca Strait and Indian Ocean which are parts of Indonesia. This 
strategy will give some influences to the “Master Plan of Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic 
Development” (Masterplan Percepatan, Perluasan, dan Pengembangan Ekonomi Indonesia - MP3EI’s) 
achievement that will become foundations for Indonesian economic development. The implementation of 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) that expand China’s access to strategic areas will affect the building of 
Indonesian economic corridors, especially under MP3EI framework. This study will discuss about the 
influence of China’s SoP towards Indonesian economic development, which is driven by MP3EI in AEC era.  
This review shows strategies available for Indonesia to minimize the influence of SoP to MP3EI’s 
achievement in the context of free market 2015. Indonesia’s potentials to increase its advantage in 
diplomacy and negotiation towards China also written in the last part of this review. 
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Abstrak -- String of Pearl (SoP) adalah strategi China untuk memperluas pengaruhnya dari China Daratan 
ke Timur Tengah melalui wilayah strategis, seperti Selat Malaka dan Samudera Hindia yang merupakan 
bagian dari Indonesia. Strategi ini akan memberi pengaruh pada "Masterplan Percepatan dan Perluasan 
Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia" (Masterplan Percepatan, Perluasan, dan Pengembangan Ekonomi 
Indonesia - MP3EI) yang akan menjadi fondasi bagi PT Pembangunan ekonomi indonesia Implementasi 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) yang memperluas akses China ke kawasan strategis akan 
mempengaruhi pembangunan koridor ekonomi Indonesia, terutama di bawah kerangka MP3EI. Studi ini 
akan membahas tentang pengaruh SoP China menuju pembangunan ekonomi Indonesia, yang didorong 
oleh MP3EI di era AEC. Studi ini menunjukkan strategi yang ada di Indonesia untuk meminimalkan 
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pengaruh pencapaian SoP terhadap MP3EI dalam konteks pasar bebas 2015. Potensi Indonesia untuk 
meningkatkan keuntungannya dalam diplomasi dan negosiasi terhadap China juga ditulis pada bagian 
akhir dari stido ini. 
Kata kunci: String of Pearl (SoP), AEC, MP3EI 
 
Introduction 
odernisation is a hit in 
Southeast Asia. Robert 
Gilpin once said, “The 
modern era has been characterized by 
integration of small and relatively distinct 
territories into larger nation-states and into 
national economies surrounded by trade 
barriers.”3 This is exactly happening in the 
region of Southeast Asia (SEA). 
Indonesia and other states in SEA 
have established the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. 
However, the fully integrated regional 
economy will just be initiated in 2015. This 
economic integration will be expanded to 
the non-SEA countries, including China, 
India, South Korea, and Japan. It even 
invites several Western countries, such as 
Russia, USA, New Zealand, and Australia. 
Gilpin’s approach on new 
institutionalism assumes that international 
and regional institutions are established to 
overcome market failures, solve 
                                                                   
3 Robert  Gilpin,  Global Political Economy: 
Understanding  the  International Economic Order, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 344. 
coordination problems, and/or eliminate 
other obstacles to economic cooperation4. 
Similarly, SEA’s economic integration aims 
regional trade liberalization as an attempt 
to solve market’s problems in coordinated 
manner in order to face any challenge for 
economic cooperation. 
ASEAN has established its three 
regional community, commonly known as 
“Three Pillars of ASEAN”, i.e. the Political-
Security, Economy, and Socio-Cultural 
community. ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC) becomes one of the most highlighted 
features of ASEAN as the ASEAN free 
market will be put into action in 2015. 
Accordingly, the readiness of the member-
states, including Indonesia, becomes highly 
intriguing. 
Indonesia prepares itself for the 
ASEAN free market by composing the 
“Master Plan of Acceleration and 
Expansion of Indonesia Economic 
Development” (Masterplan Percepatan, 
Perluasan, dan Pengembangan Ekonomi 
Indonesia - MP3EI) which constitutes the 
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Government’s strategies to develop its 
potentials under certain regional economic 
corridors. 
MP3EI success will determine the 
country’s readiness to meet ASEAN free 
market 2015 and its accomplishment in the 
future. China is one of ASEAN partners in 
economic cooperation. China has been 
employing the “String of Pearl” (SoP) 
strategy in expanding its influence to other 
countries, including those in the SEA 
region. SoP established a line that connects 
China to Persian Gulf through the South 
China Sea and the Malacca Strait. Under 
the framework of SoP, China’s influences 
incorporate military and economic 
features. 
China’s SoP potentially will affect the 
achievements of MP3EI thus Indonesian 
readiness to join ASEAN free market 2015. 
The consequences will not only appear in 
short term, but also in long-term 
development; hence its criticality. 
This writing analyzes how China’s SoP 
expansion affects Indonesian MP3EI 
achievements, particularly in AEC 
framework. The analysis is limited to any 
strategy Indonesia could compose to 
develop MP3EI vis-à-vis China’s SoP 
strategy according to the updated review 
on existing condition on both Indonesia 
and China. Lastly, this writing will be 
concluded by pointing Indonesian 
potentials that can be utilized to leverage 
its bargaining position in diplomacy and 
negotiation to China. 
This entire writing is based on 
literature review thus involves various 
references to compose a chain of facts and 
concepts and build a complete 
understanding on the topic. For that 
reason, it will not provide a profound 
solution for state policy, but rather a study 
for further knowledge of policymaking. 
Analysis 
China’s “String of Pearl” Policy 
On the early 21st century, China underwent 
significant reform on its government and 
its relations to other countries. Under the 
reform, China’s Government classified its 
territory into core and periphery regions, 
and focus on the latter’s development to 
support the earlier; thus improve domestic 
condition. The development of periphery 
region is supported by China’s foreign 
policy that highlighted its coastal and sea 
lines as strategic areas with contemporary 
economic potentials5. 
The Chinese Government is currently 
focusing on its maritime. Accordingly, China 
has    been    releasing    numerous    foreign  
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Taiwan Factor, (New Delhi: Viva Books International, 
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policies on maritime issues, which some 
experts perceived as a fundamental part of 
its national strategy. This diplomatic 
strategy is later known as the “String of 
Pearl”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. China’s Countries Project along the Indian and Pacific Ocean Littorals 
Source: Virginia Marantidou, “Revisiting Tiongkok’s ‘String of Pearls’ Strategy: 
Places ‘with Chinese Characteristics’ and Their Security Implication”, Issues & 
Insights, Vol. 14 
No.7, 2014. 
 
China SoP was developed as an 
attempt to expand its geopolitical 
influence. The “pearl” termination refers to 
the areas across the sea line from China’s 
Mainland, South China Sea littorals, 
Malacca Strait, Indian Ocean, to the coastal 
areas of Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf6. 
China’s aids and infrastructure 
development projects to the countries 
along the Indian Ocean littorals is part of 
implementation for SoP expansion7. Most 
of these projects refer to China’s attempt 
to occupy and utilize its way along the 
Malacca Strait8, as shown in Figure 1. 
Basically SoP is a part of China’s 
attempt to enhance the power of defense, 
yet its strategic orientation expands to 
include economics interest as it covers 
some highly strategic areas for politic and 
economy. However, China’s SoP also 
influences its relation with other 
surrounding littoral countries, as seen in 
                                                                   
6 Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting 
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Pearls’ Strategy: Places ‘with Chinese 
Characteristics’ and Their Security Implication”, 
Issues & Insights, Vol. 14, No. 7, June 2014.
 
8 Shee Poon Kim, “An Anatomy of China’s ‘String of 
Pearls’ Strategy”, The Hikone Ronso, No. 387, 2011, 
p.32-34. 
the emerging conflict in the South China 
Sea. 
South China Sea conflict involves six 
countries and spans in four dispute areas, 
i.e. Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, three 
islands of Pratas, and Macclefield Banks. 
Spratly Islands is claimed by China, Taiwan, 
and Vietnam, while the surrounding isles 
are claimed under Malaysia and Philippines. 
Brunei also releases a maritime zone policy, 
which includes the south reef; no formal 
claim yet. On the other hand, Paracel 
Islands is claimed under Taiwan and China. 
Scarborough Shoal that lies between 
Paracel Islands and Philippines raises a 
dispute between China and Philippines. 
Pratas Islands, located in the Southwest of 
Hong 
Kong is claimed as China’s territory 
under Taiwan occupation. Lastly, 
Macclesfield Bank is claimed under China 
and Taiwan9. All of the four dispute areas 
and other spots along the line of SoP are 
highly valuable for its natural resources, 
especially energy reserve like oil. Therefore, 
SoP becomes significant for China to 
                                                                   
9 Robert Beckman, “The South China Sea: the 
Evolving Dispute between China and Her Maritime 
Neighbours”, Geomatics World, Vol. 21 No. 3. 
expand its economical influence toward 
Asian littorals, Africa, and Latin America10. 
SoP empowers China to build access 
to some potential littoral areas thus 
expand its trade investments and regional 
development. China induces its investment 
in order to optimize its opportunity in 
exploring any resources and ‘valuable’ 
markets. China also couples its SoP 
implementation with a “Going Out” 
strategy when it comes to its international 
relations; a strategy that escalates 
domestic consumption, industry, and 
potential productions in order to diminish 
any competition. Meanwhile, China also 
builds its Sea Line of Communication 
(SLOC) to the Middle East region as an act 
to expand its sea communication in trade 
and commerce11. 
Achievements of MP3EI 
Indonesia Vision 2025 mainly focuses on 
Increase value adding and expanding value 
chain for industrial production processes, 
and increase the efficiency of the 
distribution network; encourage efficiency 
in production and improve marketing 
efforts to further integrate domestic 
markets in order to push for 
                                                                   
10 Prabhakar, op. cit., p. 5. 
11 Prabhakar, ibid., p. 7. 
competitiveness and strengthen the 
national economy; and to push for the 
strengthening of the national innovation 
system in the areas of production, process, 
and marketing with a focus on the overall 
strengthening of sustainable global 
competitiveness towards an innovation-
driven economy12. 
Indonesian Vision 2025 becomes the 
foundation for the establishment of MP3EI. 
Accordingly, MP3EI develops a strategy 
consists of three pillars, i.e. to increase the 
potential of the region through the 
development of growth centres in the 
economic corridors, strategies to 
strengthen national connectivity, as well as 
strategies to increase the capacity of 
Human Resources and Science & 
Technology13. The economic corridors are 
determined to improve existing potentials 
of each region, which all have different 
specification yet operates in synergy. The 
development theme for each corridor is as 
follow14: 
                                                                   
12 Kementerian  Koordinator  Bidang  Perekonomian  
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Bidang Perekonomian Republik Indonesia, 2011), p. 
15. 
13 Kemko Perekonomian, ibid, p. 27 
14 Kemko Perekonomian, ibid, p. 47
 
1. Sumatra Economic Corridor as “Centre 
for Production and Processing of 
Natural Resources and As Nation’s 
Energy Reserves” 
2. Java Economic Corridor as “Driver for 
National Industry and Service 
Provision” 
3. Kalimantan Economic Corridor as 
“Centre for Production and Processing 
of National Mining and Energy 
Reserves” 
4. Sulawesi Economic Corridor as “Centre 
for Production and Processing of 
National Agricultural, Plantation, 
Fishery, Oil & Gas, and Mining” 
5. Bali – Nusa Tenggara Economic Corridor 
as “Gateway for Tourism and National 
Food Support” 
6. Papua – Maluku Islands Economic 
Corridor as “Centre for Development of 
Food, Fisheries, Energy, and National 
Mining” 
These six region-based corridor need 
to be linked to fulfil the aspiration of 
synergize development. In order to 
strengthen the national connectivity, 
MP3EI also identified the strengthening of 
national connectivity as one of three main 
pillars. National connectivity consists of 
four national policy elements, namely the 
national logistic system, national 
transportation system, regional 
development, and information and 
communication technology (ICT)15. National 
connectivity is not only lies on the national 
level, but also connects elements in every 
corridor up onto national trade. 
Connectivity on national level consists of 
intra economic corridor connectivity; inter 
economic corridor connectivity, and 
international trade logistic16. 
The integration of the all the 
components in national connectivity will be 
formulated into a national connectivity 
vision, “Locally Integrated, Globally 
Connected”17. Indonesia will optimize the 
utilization of SLoC and Indonesia 
Archipelagic Sea Lanes (Alur Laut 
Kepulauan Indonesia, ALKI) to achieve 
international trade connectivity under the 
spirit of “Globally Connected”. These sea 
lines are the Straits of Malacca (SLoC), the 
Sunda Strait (ALKI 1), the Straits of Lombok 
and Makassar Straits (ALKI 2), and the 
Strait of Ombai Wetar (ALKI 3). SLoC and 
ALKI are essential to defend Indonesian 
                                                                   
15 Kemko Perekonomian, ibid, p. 33 
16 Kemko Perekonomian, ibid, p. 38
 
17 Kemko Perekonomian, ibid, p. 36 
maritime territory with 54,716 km coastal 
line, stretched to Indian Ocean, Malacca 
Strait, South China Sea, Java Sea, Maluku 
Sea, Pacific Ocean, Arafura Sea, Timor Sea, 
and other small areas18. 
MP3EI is also determined by eight 
basic principles that guide every step and 
effort of Indonesian economic 
development, as follow: 
1. Change must affect positively on all 
stakeholders of the nation; 
2. Change in mind-set starts from the 
Government and its bureaucracy; 
3. Change requires the spirit of hard work 
and the strong desire to develop 
collaborations       within       a       healthy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   
18 Kemko Perekonomian, ibid, p. 33 
competitive environment; 
4. Productivity, innovation and creativity, 
driven by science and technology; 
5. Enhancing entrepreneurship; 
6. Private sector has an important role in 
economic development; 
7. A Campaign to implement sustainable 
development principles; 
8. Campaign for change in mind-set to 
improve prosperity has to be carried 
out extensively by all stakeholders of 
the nation19. 
MP3EI are implemented under three 
phases. The first phase, quick wins phase, is 
execute in 2011-2015 and focuses on the 
operational    of    MP3EI    Committee.   The  
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Figure 2. Implementation Phases of MP3EI 
second phase focus on strengthening the 
economic and investment bases will be 
executed in 2016-2020. Lastly, the third 
phase in 2021-2025 will be focus on 
implementing sustainable growth20. 
According to the implementation 
phases in the Figure 2, Indonesia is 
currently under the first phase, which put 
the Government into an intensive 
preparation to achieve the vision of 
MP3EI. Indonesian Government is 
currently committing to several basic 
requirements, such as establishing 
committee, developing the corridors 
along with its each R&D institution. 
However, albeit the earlier stage of 
implementation, Indonesia has shown a 
significant economic growth. 
According to the figures on Table 1, 
Indonesian economy is still stable. 
Actually, the 2015’s figures do not show 
any improvement from those in 2011’s due 
to global economic crises in Europe and 
other major countries. It was even 
worsened by the Arab Spring in the most 
of Middle Easterners oil producers21. 
Positive national income depicts low 
level in exchange rate and domestic 
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21 OECD, ibid., p. 205 
demand22. An inadequate domestic 
demand indicates weakened market thus 
Indonesia is no longer perceived as 
potential market. Under this 
circumstance, domestic industries are 
motivated to export most of their 
products and services; hence the trade 
surplus. 
However, this situation shows a 
significant improvement compared to its 
previous years. According to Bank 
Indonesia (BI) and Statistic Indonesia 
(Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS), Indonesia’s 
consumption rate in 2010 depicted a 
dynamic that was not corresponding the 
net export, as shown in Table 222. 
According to Table 2, in 2005 
Indonesian net export has plummeted 86.4 
points from its previous, while 
consumption rate dropped only 1%. Another 
anomaly also happened when the highest 
rise of net export in 2006 followed by 
lower consumption rate with 0.7% 
difference. 
                                                                   
22 Dewi Ernita, et.al., “Analisis Pertumbuhan 
Ekonomi, Investasi, dan Konsumsi di Indonesia”, 
Jurnal Kajian Ekonomi, Vol. I, No. 2, January 2013. 
Table 1. Indonesia’s Macroeconomics Indicator 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
      
Real GDP Growth 6.5 6.3 5.8 5.7 6.3 
      
Inflation (CPI), period average  5.4 4.3 7.0 5.4 4.7 
       
Short-term Interest Rate  6.9 5.9 6.1 7.3 6.4 
       
Fiscal Balance (%)  -1.1 -1.9 -2.2 -2.2 -2.0 
       
Current Account Balance ($ billion)  1.7 -24.4 -32.5 -26.8 -26.8 
       
Current Account Balance (% GDP)  0.2 -2.8 -3.7 -3.1 -2.7 
       
Source: The OECD Economic Outlook Vol. 2014/123      
Table 2. Indonesian Consumption Rate and Net Export Percentage before MP3EI 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
            
 Consumption (%) 3.8 3.9 4.9 3.9 3.2 5.0 5.3 4.8 4.6 
            
 Net Export (%) 8.9 18.6 47.5 -38.9 12.8 6.4 7.6 12.4 7.4 
            
            
                                                                   
23 OECD, The OECD Economic Outlook , Vol. 1/2014, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014), p. 206. 
MP3EI has demonstrated positive 
achievement on its earlier stage with some 
ground-breaking investment projects on 
real sector and infrastructure building. The 
investment reached a total of Rp 499.5 
trillion consisted of Rp 357.8 trillion for 56 
projects in real sector and Rp 141.7 trillion 
for 38 infrastructure projects. Those 
projects had multi-sourced fund from the 
state budget, private, state-owned 
enterprises (BUMN), and public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). The Government 
managed 24 projects with the total of Rp 
71.6 trillion, BUMN managed 24 projects 
with Rp 131.0 trillion, private sectors 
managed 38 projects with Rp 168.6 trillion, 
and PPP managed 8 projects with Rp 128.3 
trillion24. 
State regulation also supported 
MP3EI when the Coordinating Ministry for 
the Economy (Menko Perekonomian) 
released Ministerial Decree No. 1/2012 
(Permen no. 1/2012), highlighted necessary 
programs to improve and develop 
Indonesia’s export: (i) strengthening 
export competition by developing its 
premium and potential products as well as 
                                                                   
24 Sholeh, “Persiapan Indonesia dalam Menghadapi 
AEC (ASEAN Economic Community) 2015”, eJournal 
Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, Vol. 1 No. 2 2013. 
improving product design; (ii) improving 
quality and quantity for trade facility with 
the more coordinated Indonesia EXIM Bank 
(Lembaga Pembiayaan Ekspor Indonesia, 
LPEI) and other related institutions; (iii) 
establishing national team for Export and 
Investment Improvement (Peningkatan 
Ekspor dan Peningkatan Investasi, PEPI) in 
order to strengthen the role of Indonesian 
Export Insurance (Asuransi Ekspor 
Indonesia, ASEI); (iv) increasing promotion; 
(v) developing regional export as well as 
urging Regional Development Bank (Bank 
Pembangunan Daerah, BPD) and other 
institutions to provide financial needs in 
exporting regional SMEs products; (vi) 
enhancing trade diplomacy in international 
forums and organizations like AEC, APEC, 
and WTO; (vii) enhancing coordination in 
managing international trade issues. Trade 
and economic diplomacy are the most 
important consideration in Indonesian 
foreign policy making. Economy diplomacy 
can be employed in any activities 
promoting Indonesia’s potentials25. 
Not all the above improvements of 
Indonesian macroeconomic made its safe 
                                                                   
25 Mahfudz Siddiq, “Indonesia Butuh Politik
 Luar Negeri Berorientasi Ekonomi”,
 JurnalDiplomasi, Vol. 4, No.1, March 2012. 
from crises, as Indonesia was still 
vulnerable to economic and financial crises. 
Its national growth could not be steady, as 
it did not ensue the improvement of human 
resources26. Consequently, MP3EI’s 
implementation could only scratch on the 
macroeconomic level and not yet dive 
deeply into the quality of human resources. 
Southeast Asian Free Market 2015 
Free market initiation in the Southeast Asia 
has been established in 1972, mostly 
through declaration of intent in slower 
pace. ASEAN establishment had never been 
addressed for such economic initiatives27; 
hence the formation of the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC). 
AEC committed implementation is 
divided onto four periods in the span of 
eight years, in 2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2012-
2013, and 2014-201528. The AEC is founded 
upon the principles of open economy, 
outward-looking, inclusive, and market-
driven, while still considers multilateral 
                                                                   
26 P. Eko Prasetyo,“The Quality of Growth: Peran 
Teknologi dan Investasi Human Capital sebagai 
Pemacu Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Berkualitas”, 
JEJAK: Jurnal Ekonomi dan Kebijakan, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
September 2008. 
27 Siddiq, op. cit. 
28 ASEAN Secretariat, The ASEAN Charter, (Jakarta: 
ASEAN Secretariat, 2008), p. 54. 
cooperation and economic discrepancy 
among ASEAN member-states29. 
Shino-ASEAN relation has been 
initiated since 1991, then formally stated as 
full partner in 199630.  In November 2002, 
ASEAN and China signed the “Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation” (ACFTA) which would be 
effective in 2010 for Indonesia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and China, and 2015 
for the rest31. China and ASEAN signed 
three more MoU in the 12th ASEAN Summit, 
Thailand in October 2009. These MoU 
include the Establishment of ASEAN-China 
Centre, Cooperation on Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPTs), and Technical 
Regulations and Conformity Assessment32. 
The Influence of China’s “String of Pearl” 
to MP3EI Achievements 
Sino-ASEAN trade relation is technically 
abide by Framework Agreement On 
Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation 
between The Association Of Southeast Asian 
Nations And The People’s Republic of China. 
The objectives of this agreement are to: (1) 
strengthen and enhance economic, trade 
                                                                   
29 ASEAN Secretariat, ibid, p. 56 
30 ASEAN Secretariat, ibid, p. 67 
31 ASEAN Secretariat, ibid, p. 169-170
 
32 ASEAN Secretariat, ibid, p. 170 
and investment co-operation between the 
Parties; (2) progressively liberalize and 
promote trade in goods and services as 
well as create a transparent, liberal and 
facilitative investment regime; (3) explore 
new areas and develop appropriate 
measures for closer economic co-operation 
between the Parties; and (4) facilitate the 
more effective economic integration of the 
newer ASEAN Member States and bridge 
the development gap among the Parties33. 
One of the agreement under the 
framework is a Sino-ASEAN free trade. 
Under this new special relation, they 
engage in progressive elimination of tariffs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   
33 Suryani Indriastuti, “Pembentukan Perdagangan 
Bebas ASEAN-China (ASEAN-China Free Trade Area) 
dan Dampaknya bagi Petani di Indonesia”, Jurnal 
Ilmu-ilmu Pertanian, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2005. 
and non-tariff barriers in substantially all 
trade in goods, in three implementing 
programs: Early Harvest Program (EHP), 
Exclusion List Program (ELP), and General 
Exceptions. EHP requires all parties with 
export readiness to reduce and eliminate 
their tariff and non-tariff barriers for certain 
products under EHP. EHP will be enforced 
until 2010. 
Furthermore, ELP covers agreement 
to reduce and eliminate tariff for non-EHP 
products. This privilege is applied for 
products with sensitive features that could 
harm national economy. Lastly, the General 
Exception accepts no tariff   reduction   and  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. FDI in ASEAN by Receiving Countries 
Source: Mahfudz Siddiq, “Indonesia Butuh Politik Luar Negeri Berorientasi Ekonomi”, 
Jurnal Diplomasi, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2012. 
elimination for historic and/or artistic 
products and commodity, and those that 
has moral, humanity, and health safety 
features34. 
Trade was not much different for 
Indonesia. Amid its trade surplus with 
Malaysia, Laos, Philippines, Cambodia, and 
Myanmar, Indonesia still could not catch 
the loss from its declining trade with 
Vietnam and a major deficit vis-à-vis 
Singapore35. Eventually Indonesia still 
suffered from a negative trade balance. 
Generally, domestic condition is 
appeared as major hindrance for 
Indonesian readiness to join the free 
market 2015. In its third quick-win years, 
MP3EI has not yet optimize to utilize the 
AEC,   since   it   is   also deal with pressures 
from the newly elected Government. 
President Joko Widodo would have his 
focus more on administrative reformation, 
infrastructure development, and social 
policy36. This new priority would be a 
positive attraction for foreign investment, 
however, President Joko Widodo also 
                                                                   
34 Indriaastuti, ibid., p. 121 
35 Siddiq, op. cit. 
36 Deyi Tandan Zhixiang Su, “ASEAN  Economics: 
Cyclical and Structural Forces at Play”, 
ASEAN Economics Chartbook, (Hongkong: Morgan 
Stanley, 2014), p. 13. 
underlined his plan to reduce import on 
food products37. 
Indonesia and China’s economic 
condition shows a great deal of 
discrepancy. In economic growth, China 
has reached the point of 7.7% in 2014 and 
forecasted to be stable until 2018; 
meanwhile Indonesia reached 6.0% on the 
same period38. China has currently focused 
on financial efficiency policy through 
institutional reform, while Indonesia is still 
occupied with social problems, such as 
disaster relief and education39. Moreover, 
China also holds another superiority, which 
also alarms the West; its capability for 
market monopoly. 
China has been expanding its great 
influences by establishing state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to compete with the 
power of foreign multinational 
corporations (MNCs) domestically and 
globally. These SOEs are also capable to 
acquire all the assets of western 
corporations40. 
                                                                   
37 Su, ibid., p. 13 
38 OECD, Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China 
and India 2014 beyond the Middle-Income 
Trap, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013), p. 2. 
39 OECD, ibid., p. 8 
40 National Intelligence Council, “Nonstate Actors: 
Impact on International Relations and Implications 
for the United States”, NIC-Eurasia Group Seminars, 
According to Lovel, there are four 
factors that determine one’s foreign policy 
and show the pattern of international 
interaction, i.e. the structure of 
international system; perception n of the 
elites; strategy of other nation-states; and 
national capability41. These four factors also 
determine Indonesian foreign policy 
toward China’s SoP, and depict their 
mutual interaction. Indonesian strategy 
review toward China is shown in Table 2. 
If Indonesian capability was superior 
vis-à-vis China, Indonesia may apply 
confrontation or leading strategy. 
Confrontation is applied if China poses as 
a threat, while leadership strategy is 
applied if it was perceived to support 
Indonesian interest. 
On the other hand, under inferior 
circumstance, Indonesia may apply 
accommodation or concordance strategy. 
If China poses as a threat, the less capable 
Indonesia would likely to put a good 
relation to avoid any harmful 
confrontation. Meanwhile, in 
concordance strategy, Indonesia would 
                                                                                                      
(Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 
2007), p. 3.
 
41 John P. Lovel, Foreign Policy in Perspective: 
Strategy, Adaptation, Decision Making, (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970), p. 98-101. 
tend to comply with China, as it seems 
more beneficial. 
Indonesian strategy toward China’s 
SoP is analysed as follow: 
a. Structure of International System 
International relation today is 
functioned on multipolar structure with the 
trend of numerous non-state actors, 
including regional organization. The rise of 
regional organization depicts the tighter 
interaction among neighbouring countries, 
for instance in the Southeast Asia. ASEAN 
has demonstrated the more intimate 
interaction among its member-states, 
which expected to be improved with the 
implementation of ASEAN Community in 
2015. Moreover, ASEAN also poses a closer 
cooperation with its major partners outside 
the region whose powers would likely to 
signify the future’s globalization. One of 
ASEAN’s major partners is China. 
Throughout the last decade, China has 
been raising as the new polar and 
expanding its influence worldwide. Under 
ACFTA, ASEAN and China formalized their 
interaction in free trade, thus as one
Table 2. Analysis of Indonesian Strategy towards China  
     
  Indonesian Capability : Superior  
     
  Confrontation 
Leadership Strategy 
 
China’s SoP as a Strategy China’s SoP as a  
threat 
   
support  Accommodation 
Concordance Strategy   
Strategy 
 
    
     
  Indonesian Capability : Inferior  
     
Source: John P. Lovel, Foreign Policy in Perspective: Strategy, Adaptation, Decision Making, 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970), hlm. 98—101 (writer’s analysis). 
of its member-state Indonesia has 
opened its market to China’s 
products and services since 2010. The 
amount import of China-originated 
products would likely to increase 
after AEC. According to those 
analysis, the writer concludes the 
multipolar system has been always 
abided by cooperation frameworks in 
any sectors, including economy. 
ASEAN and China are the newly rising 
polar. As ASEAN member-state, any 
ASEAN agreement would also bond 
Indonesia. Therefore, Indonesia is 
required to join the AEC and open its 
market in the free trade under ACFTA 
with China. 
b. The Elites’ Perception 
President Joko Widodo’s administration 
has its focus on administrative reform, 
infrastructure development, and social 
policy. Through a comprehensive 
reform in administrative and 
infrastructure, Indonesia expects higher 
inflow of foreign investment. 
Moreover, a proper social policy may 
provide a better preparation for 
Indonesians in joining free market era. 
However, the President’s policy to 
reduce import on food products will be 
conflicted with ACFTA agreement, 
especially after AEC is implemented in 
2015. Indonesians diets are mostly 
sourced from living livestock and crops 
and still cannot be replaced by synthetic 
foods yet. Living livestock and crops 
both fall into the EHP category, thus 
cannot be protected by reducing import 
quantity. By 2015, every country in the 
ASEAN and China must be ready to 
enter the free trade for “early harvest” 
products, including livestock and crops. 
The statement from President Joko 
Widodo captured political elites’ 
perception that will choose not to harm 
their people. This current 
administration founded on the efforts 
to improve the life of its people. 
However, the Parliament’s insight 
would still unknown, while the parties-
backed Legislative often has various 
perception on ASEAN free market 2015. 
In that reason, the elite’s perspective is 
analysed from official statements of the 
President. 
c. China’s SoP in Indonesian Territory 
China’s SoP is undoubtedly passing 
inside Indonesian territory. This line 
would likely to affect development’s 
progress on the islands next to South 
China Sea and Malacca Strait. Under the 
MP3EI framework, SoP influence would 
firstly affect the development of 
Sumatera and Kalimantan corridors. 
Both are directly bordered the SoP’ 
lines and more importantly become 
future energy reserves, natural 
resources, and minerals. Other than 
energy, Sumatera Corridor becomes 
vital to secure the Malacca Strait, which 
marked as one of the strategic area in 
the SoP to reach Persian Gulf. It is on 
China’s interest to join the line of 
defence against piracy in Malacca Strait. 
China’s presence in the Malacca Strait 
enhances its influence to Sumatera 
Corridor, and a closer China-Indonesia 
may disrupt Indonesia’s defence 
relations with India. China and India 
have never been in harmony, therefore 
China’s interest to defend Malacca 
Strait may conflicts India’s. This clash of 
interest between Indonesian two 
strategic partners may hamper the 
development of Sumatera Corridor, and 
further disrupt other corridor’s 
development under the inter-corridor 
connectivity. In the national and 
regional level, Indonesia may 
unsuccessfully optimize its capability to 
endure the AEC because the attempt to 
achieve national integrity and inter-
ASEAN regional connectivity is 
interrupted. Consequently, China’s SoP 
will highly influences the MP3EI 
achievements, which further will reduce 
Indonesian readiness in free market 
2015. It is essential to consider the SoP 
in shaping the future foreign policy’s 
strategy toward China. 
d. China’s Capability 
China has been using three interrelated 
strategies to strengthen its economy, 
i.e. the SoP, “Going Out” strategy, and 
market monopoly. These strategies has 
also been shaping China’s posture in 
regional relation with ASEAN, and with 
Indonesia as its bilateral partner. The 
“Going Out” strategy ensures China’s 
steady economy by spurring domestic 
consumption and production. Higher 
consumption attracts investments and 
it makes a good pose as export’s 
market. Meanwhile higher production 
pushes domestic productivity to 
maintain economic growth and 
people’s welfare. In order to support 
this strategy, China also has established 
its state-owned enterprise to confine 
any dominating foreign industries. In 
short, China utilises its higher 
consumption to increase productivity, 
which creates well-being industries and 
maintains export activity under the 
state-owned enterprises. Under these 
two strategies, China improves its 
economy and finance, which later 
increase its capability in its relation with 
other partner like Indonesia. In the 
context of SoP, China’s economy and 
financial advancement will surely make 
a higher capability in controlling the 
littoral lanes. China demonstrates its 
capability in the region by managing the 
South China Sea conflict against four 
disputed ASEAN countries, and one that 
is claimed as a part of its own. Outside 
the ASEAN, China also grasps several 
notable positions in the United Nations 
(UN), Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), and has been 
categorized as the newly rising power 
with BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China). 
Considering all the above factors, 
Indonesia holds less capability against 
China which makes the “accommodation 
strategy” or “concordance strategy” as the 
most logical to apply. To be more specific, 
the strategy can be narrowed down into 
one, the accommodation strategy, if 
Indonesia considers China’s threatening 
stance toward MP3EI achievement. 
By employing the accommodation 
strategy, Indonesia should enhance its 
cooperation with China in every aspect, and 
capture any opportunity to do this, 
especially in the economy. A closer 
cooperation will put Indonesia as a 
strategic partner for China’s foreign policy, 
which will reduce the possibility of any 
conflicting interaction. In the other hand, 
to avoid any disruption in MP3EI 
achievements, Indonesia may attract 
China’s cooperation in developing the 
Sumatra and Kalimantan Corridors. This 
opportunity can yield in some beneficial 
result for Indonesia and the people in the 
corridors. 
Furthermore, Indonesia should also 
seek an approach to accommodate China’s 
interest to secure the Malacca Strait 
without creating any friction with India. 
Indonesian accommodative strategy 
cannot ignore the opportunity to advance 
its capability. Indonesia sits on numerous 
potentials that can me managed for 
stronger bargaining position. The prime 
reason is Indonesian strategic position in 
the Malacca Strait allows it to invite any 
cooperation in securing the Strait. 
Second, Indonesia is demographically 
powerful. It has the biggest population in 
the ASEAN, which generates an interesting 
amount of potential market destination. 
This feature is surely appealing for China’s 
growing industries. 
Indonesia is currently crafting its  way 
to  be  more  internationally acknowledge. 
Indonesia has been holding a significant 
position in ASEAN, which allows it to sway 
regional policy’s direction. Moreover, as 
one of the influential actors in the region, 
Indonesia holds a neutral position for the 
South China Sea conflicts. Indonesian 
neutral and cooperative stance has been 
opening windows for many regional forums 
and discussion with China regarding the 
issue. China also perceives Indonesia as a 
bridge for its partnership with the U.S., 
India, and Australia. Maintaining a positive 
relation with Indonesia will be an interest 
for a stable presence in the region. 
All of these growing capabilities are 
advantageous for Indonesia. Indonesia 
becomes essential for China’s interest in 
ASEAN and the successful of SoP strategy. 
Utilizing this opportunity will fortunate the 
developments of MP3EI corridors and 
turning China’s threatening strategy into a 
potential opportunity. 
Conclusion 
China SoP strategy has a definite influence 
for MP3EI development and national 
preparedness in facing ASEAN free market 
2015. Originally, SoP strategy poses a threat 
and it is logical for Indonesia to apply the 
accommodation strategy. However, 
Indonesia is capable to utilize SoP as a wide 
opportunity to accelerate the MP3EI 
achievement by performing its strategic 
role in bilateral and regional relation with 
China. 
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